JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
I. INTRODUCTION
In most countries the prevailing rule of liability for medical injuries is some form of negligence rule (Schwartz, 1992) . Many countries, including the UK, the US, and Canada, are increasingly dissatis fied with this traditional system. In theory, the tort system is designed to deter medical negligence and to compensate patients injured as a result of negli gent care. The evidence suggests that it performs these functions imperfectly, at best, and at high cost, including high overhead costs. Although rough estimates suggest that the frequency and cost of malpractice claims is several-fold higher in the US than in other countries (Danzón, 1990) , there is a common concern over the frequency of medical injuries and claims, and the costs of compensation and of malpractice insurance premiums.
Over the last two decades most states in the US have enacted some tort reforms for medical malpractice, including caps on awards, offset of benefits from other collateral sources, shorter statutes of limita tíons, screening and mediation panels, etc. Some of these reforms have moderated the growth innumber of claims and size of awards (Danzón, 1984a (Danzón, , 1986 Zuckerman et al., 1990) Since concern over medical malpractice has been triggered by its budget cost to payers and apparent inequity in compensation, reform proposals tend to focus on these features. However, a broader view of the real social cost of medical injuries indicates that the primary function of a medical liability system should be quality control ('deterrence'). Compen sation can be provided at lower cost and more equitably through other public and private insur ance systems. Thus the tort system and tort reform must be evaluated in the context of the full network of systems of quality control and injury compensa tion that exist in all countries. In this paper, section II outlines the economic theory of professional liability. Section III summarizes the shortfalls be tween this theory and the actual operation of mal practice systems. Sections IV, V, and VI evaluate proposed reforms, including traditional tort re forms, the Swedish and New Zealand no-fault compensation schemes,, and proposals for an ad ministrative fault-based system (AMA, 1988) and enterprise liability. Section VII concludes.
II. THE THEORY OF TORT LIABILITY
Physicians and other learned professionals-in cluding architects, attorneys, and accountantshave been singled out from other occupations in their professional liability to clients. The tradition al basis for professional liability is negligence. Under a negligence rule, the plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a duty of care, that he failed to conform to the required standard of care, and that this failure was the proximate cause of the plain tiffs injury. Traditional rules of tort damages pro vide for full compensation of pecuniary and non pecuniary damages. Thus, in principle, the law of medical malpractice holds health-care providers liable only for medically-caused (iatrogenic) inju ries that are caused by negligence; adverse out comes that are consistent with the normal risks of customary medical care are the burden of the pa tient. Nevertheless, most professionals consider liability insurance to be a prerequisite of profes sional practice. A fundamental principle of liability rules is that, if all parties are fully informed about risks and con tracting is costless, then the allocation of resources to loss prevention will be the same, regardless of whether the liability rule is caveat emptor (all losses reside with the victim) or strict liability (all losses shifted to the injurer) (Coase, 1963) . But if consumers misperceive risks or contracting is cost ly, then caveat emptor leads to non-optimal acci dent rates andnon-optimal insurance (Spence, 1977; Shavell, 1980 by definition it is cheaper to prevent injuries that would be deemed neghgent than to pay for the resulting damages (Shavell, 1982) . Injuries that optimally are notprevented could be covered through private first-party or social insurance.
The neghgence system operates in practice very differently from this theoretical ideal, primarily because the decision-makers-courts, doctors, patients, liability insurers-lack the perfect infor mation that is assumed by the models (Danzón, 1991a (Danzón, 19846,1986; Zuckerman et al., 1990 (ii) Mismatch between Claims and Injuries
The high cost of malpractice claims is not by itself evidence of system malfunction. The number of malpractice claims in the US appears to fall far short of the number of negligent injuries; for other countries there is no evidence, but the shortfall is likely to be even larger. Two detailed studies of hospital records in California (Mills et al., 1977) andNew York (Weiler et al., 1993) Compensating small claims through the tort system is probably not cost-effective, given other lower cost compensationmechanisms. Overall incentives for care depend on the pecuniary and non-pecuniary penalties from the claims that are filed, on provid ers' risk aversion, and on other quality-assurance mechanisms.7
The ratio of claims to negligent injuries wasmuchhigherfor serious injuries: roughly one claim is filed for every three such injuries and one in six is paid (Weiler et al., 1993) . Given an iatrogenic injury, the probability of suit is substan tially greater if there is a valid basis for a claim.
Although the Harvard study concluded that many of the claims filed lacked evidence of a medically caused injury, this could reflect the limited infor mation available to the reviewers. In other studies using more complete information, independent re viewers have concluded that negligence was cer tainly present in roughly 31 per cent of cases and not present in 44 per cent, with the remainder uncertain 6 More recent estimates for the UK show the rate of new claims per 100 hospital doctors at 10.5 (Fenn, 1993ft) . This is not directly comparable to the US rate of 13 claims per 100 doctors, since the US figure applies to all medical specialties, including primary care doctors who are much less likely to be sued than surgical specialists. 7 With costly litigation, it may be optimal to have a low probability of suit but high penalties. The optimal tort award for deterrence purposes is lower if market forces or other quality-assurance mechanisms are partially effective (see Spence, 1977) . (Farber and White, 1991) . For claims with negli gence, the probability of payment was 0.64, and the average payment was $258,000; for claims without negligence the probability of payment was 0.24 and the average payment was $65,900. This suggests that the most extreme criticisms of the tort system as a random lottery are exaggerated.
(iii) Unequal Compensation
Another common criticism is that tort awards often provide very unequal compensation for similar injuries. However, although equal compensation for similar injuries might be appropriate if compen sation were the sole purpose of the tort system, deterrence may require unequal payment for simi larinjuries. Theory and empirical evidence suggest that the settlement process adjusts payments for the degree of negligence, even though comparative fault is not the typical rule, and this is consistent with efficient deterrence (and with some defini tions of fairness). Several studies confirm that the disposition of claims conforms to some degree to legal rules (Danzón and Lillard, 1983; Färber and White, 1991) . Nevertheless, considerable unpre dictability remains and this undermines deterrence, creates incentives for defensive medicine, and con tributes to volatility in liability-insurance markets.
(iv) Inappropriate Compensation
Another valid concern is that awards for pain and suffering, which account for a large and probably growing fraction of malpractice pay-out, may ex ceed levels necessary for optimal compensation.8
Theory cannot determine optimal compensation for irreplaceable loss, but there is a strong presump tion that payments for pain and suffering are too high in the US (Cook and Graham, 1977; Danzón, 19846) . The unpredictability of these awards un dermines their value for patient insurance and for deterrence; it also contributes to volatility in liabil ity-insurance markets. Scheduled limits on awards for non-economic loss, related to the plaintiffs age and injury severity, are used explicitly in countries such as Sweden. This type of reform is likely to reduce litigation, by reducing uncertainty and the parties' influence over the outcome, with tittle if any loss in efficiency of deterrence and compensa tion.
(v) High Overhead Costs
A final area of concern is the high cost of litigation and implied high overhead rate on patient compen sation, relative to other compensation mechanisms.
The fact-finding undertaken in liability systems is worth incurring only if there are offsetting deter rence benefits. While this is unproven it is plausible (see Danzón, 1985) and there is some empirical evidence of significant deterrence effects. Weiler et al. (1993) find evidence that the proportion of injuries attributable to negligence was lower in hospitals facing a higher probability of being sued, given a negligent injury.9 Extrapolating, they con clude that the proportion of negligent injuries per hospital admission would be 80 per cent higher if tort liability were eliminated. This is probably a lower bound on the deterrent effect of tort liability, assuming that the average deterrent effect exceeds that marginal effect observed from cross-sectional analysis. Moreover, elimination of tort liability would probably result in some reduction in other quality assurance and professional monitoring sys tems, that have been strengthened in response to liability. Thus, in practice, liability and other qual ity-control efforts may be complements, not substi tutes.
IV. TRADITIONAL TORT REFORMS
All of the perceived defects of the status quoimperfect deterrence, imperfect experience-rating of liability insurance, imperfect compensation, and high litigation costs-are ultimately attributable to imperfect information on the part of courts, plain tiffs, and providers. Although imperfect informa tion under caveat emptor is a rationale for provider liability, changing the liability rule does not of itself create better information. The practical choice is thus between imperfect alternatives. In evaluat ing proposed reforms and alternatives, the practical question is whether they are likely to improve 8 Five per cent of claims account for 50 per cent of dollars paid in compensation (Danzón and Lillard, 1983 ). 9 The Harvard study (Weiler et al., 1993) did not find statistically significant evidence that a higher risk of suit reduces the absolute number of negligent injuries. However, there are statistical reasons why such an effect may be hard to detect. efficiency in deterrence, compensation, and admin istration, or at least improve one dimension without loss along others.
Some modifications of traditional rules would plau sibly offer net benefits, at least in the US (Danzón, 1985) . In particular, annuitized payments (but with amounts fixed at claim disposition) and scheduled limits on awards for non-pecuniary loss, based on injury severity and the plaintiff's life expectancy, are consistent with optimal insurance and would reduce litigation with minimal if any loss in deter rence. Collateral source offset significantly reduces cost internalization and is therefore, in theory, less desirable than subrogation; however, since subrogation may entail higher transactions costs, determining the optimal mechanism for eliminat ing double compensation is an empirical question, the answer to which may differ across countries.
Proposals for screening and mediation panels, in tended to streamline claim disposition, may simply increase delay and costs, unless significant penal ties are imposed for appeal from their decisions to the courts. Adopting the English rule for allocation of court costs could reduce frivolous suits. Howev er, in order to protect risk-averse plaintiffs, defence costs should be applied against the plaintiff s attor ney, if paid on a contingent basis, rather than against the individual plaintiff.
These reforms are less relevant to the UK and other European countries to the extent that damages are already constrained by schedules or implicit rules, payments from public health-care systems and oth er social insurance are netted out of the tort award (collateral source offset), rules of discovery and procedure are less prone to exploitation,10 and rules for cost allocation discourage frivolous suits.
V. NO-FAULT ALTERNATIVES
Even if the most extreme criticisms of the tort system are exaggerated, the question remains wheth er alternatives would be more cost-effective. The
Swedish model has been adopted in Norway and
Finland and has been suggested in the UK (see Fenn, 1993a) 11 For a more detailed description and evaluation of the Swedish and New Zealand systems, see Danzón (1993 Danzón ( ,1994 pensable. This is similar to the criterion of 'unin tended and unexpected' adverse consequences pro posed by Weiler (1991) , which was rejected by the founders of the PCI as unworkable (Oldertz, 1988) .
Defining compensability in terms of an event that is unexpected or of unexpected severity suppresses but does not eliminate the need to determine wheth er the care was appropriate. If 'expected' is defined as a statistical probability, this depends on the level Prior to 1992 the costs of iatrogenic injuries were hidden in the payroll and general taxes that financed all injury compensation to workers and non-work ers, respectively. The 1992 reforms authorize the 21 Venell (1992, p. 4) notes that in one case appealed to the High Court, 'Bisson J. appeared to move away from the previous objective approach, that if the risk was one that was known to the medical profession then it was not medical misadventure. He adopted a subjective approach which involved looking at things from the point of view of the victim (and her medical advisers). ' Duncan (1984) refers to an injury 'which is unexpected and undesigned by the person injured'. 22 'It has been apparent that difficult questions of causation manifest themselves when the task is to establish a causal link rather than, as in negligence, having to prove that a potential tortfeasor has failed to attain an appropriate standard of care, to which the subsequent damage was causally linked' (Venell, 1992) . The suggestion is thus that causation is more, not less difficult to establish, once the element of negligence is removed.
ACC to establish a medical misadventure account, funded by premiums paid by registered health-care professionals, with experience-rating andno-claims bonuses. This is consistent with the shift towards greater autonomy and accountability of health-care providers as part of the reform of the health-care sector.23 Whether the ACC will in fact exercise its authority to assess medical providers remains to be seen. In the past it has compressed employer premi ums rather than exploit its full statutory authority to use experience-rating. As in Sweden, lack of com petition-the ACC is a public monopoly insureris a necessary condition for the survival of flat-rated premiums. The 1992 reforms also authorized the ACC to report potentially negligent medical misadventures to the appropriate disciplinary body.
However, since reporting is apparently discretion ary, the effect of this clause also remains to be seen.
The New Zealand experience under the original ACC structure illustrates pitfalls to be avoided rather than providing a useful prototype that other countries might copy. The original definition of a compensable event raised practical and philosoph ical issues that led almost inevitably to proposals to expand the system to cover incapacity. However, the huge budget costs of such a system and the difficulty of defining incapacity led to the restora tion of a quasi-negligence criterion of patient com pensation, but without provider-specific liability, that resembles in some ways the PCI criterion.
As in the Swedish PCI, the low administrative costs should not be interpreted as a measure of efficiency.
Rather, low overheads reflect the elimination of all links between compensation and deterrence. The causes of medical injuries are not investigated and there is no feedback to the individual providers that are responsible for the injuries. The proposed intro duction of experience-rated premiums for physi cians is likely to raise providers' opposition to patient compensation and hence raise litigation and overhead costs. As in Sweden, the elimination of all provider liability, explicit or implicit, is crucial to the non-adversarial adjudication of claims. In addi tion, in New Zealand the very low overhead per centage reflects the rapid increase in claims pay ments (the denominator) owing to minimal claims investigation. The true overheads of an insurance or accident compensation scheme include not only the measured overheads, but also the deadweight loss from unnecessary injuries and inappropriately com pensated claims (Danzón, 1992) . Unfortunately this is not observable, but in the ACC it is likely to be very high. important to identify the problems that the scheme is intended to address and evaluate the scheme in the context of its overall effect on the social costs of injuries, including deterrence and true overhead costs, not merely the more visible budget costs.
VI. OTHER PROPOSED
Here I comment briefly on two comprehensive US proposals and on the NHS indemnity scheme in the UK. In order to encourage settlement, both the plaintiff and defendant(s) would be required to make blind set tlement offers prior to the hearing, and would be subject to sanctions if they rejected an offer that is not significantly bettered at the hearing. The hear ing resembles a traditional trial, except that it is adjudicated by an examiner experienced in medical malpractice claims, rather than judge or jury; ap peal is to the appellate courts, but on rules of law only. Thus the court cannot review the facts or the finding of liability in a particular case or set medical Standards; the Board has ultimate authority over these functions.
To strengthen professional discipline, the Board would operate a clearing-house for reports from several sources, including settlements and awards in malpractice cases, hospital reviews, reports from other physicians (who are required to report sus pected incompetence, impairment, and drug or alcohol dependence of their colleagues), and other state disciplinary actions. The Board can also in vestigate reports of substandard performance from several sources, including members of the public and, following a full due process proceeding, may impose sanctions including fines and licence revo cation.
The proposal does not specify in detail how the system would be financed. The optimal system of financing would depend on the extent to which the system implicitly includes pure social insurance components, for example, as a result of offering free legal aid to patients whose claims pass the initial screea Although the incremental deterrence value of provider-specific premiums might be small, given the direct feedback from claims adjudication to the disciplinary process, the incremental cost may also be small, in terms of increased incentives for providers to oppose claims. Because the AMA retains provider liability, pro vider incentives to oppose claims remain. In part 24 Haddock and Curran (1985) show that a comparative negligence standard is potentially efficient if applied conditional on a violation of the standard of care. This is implicit in the AMA proposal which requires fault in addition to the comparative measure of causation.
this reflects the intent to use the adversarial process to eliminate frivolous claims. The AMA offers free legal representation to claims that pass an initial screen, and permits patients to represent them selves at that screening, whereas the patient's sub mission to the PCI (and subsequent appeals) must be in writing only, unless special permission is received for oral representation. The AMA process is public and would certainly be subject to contin ued public scrutiny for fairness to patients, whereas the PCI faces no public scrutiny. For all these reasons, the AMA approach is unlikely to yield low per capita budget cost and overhead cost compara ble to the PCI. However, it offers greater deterrence and more generous rights to plaintiffs, partly re flecting the political requirement that any serious reform proposal must offer gains to both sides, relative to the status quo in that country.
The PCI experience suggests that this administra tive alternative would be held to some accountabil ity because of the implicit or explicit threat that, if it operated unfairly, the tort system would be re established. The Swedish experience indicates that, if providers prefer the administrative alternative, they will design it such that patients are at least as well off under the administrative alternative as they would be under the tort system. In that case the administrative alternative is clearly a Pareto-im provement: it survives only as long as both sides are better off.
(ii) Elective Strict (No-fault) Liability (ESL)
This proposal, modelled on the workers' compen sation system (Weiler, 1991; Weiler et al., 1993) , would empower hospitals and other health-care organizations to offer an administrative alternative, in return for a waiver from common law tort liabil ity. The proposal is for an elective system initially, in order to gain experience before moving to wider implementation. Danzón, 1993 Danzón, , 1994 (iii) The NHS Indemnity
In 1990 the NHS introduced an indemnity scheme for its employees, whereby the Department of Health assumes liability for all treatments provided by its employees.26 GPs* medical malpractice sub scriptions (premiums) have always been reimbursed as a practice expense, but hospital doctors paid their own subscriptions. This system broke down in the 1980s with the rising cost of claims. The Medical Defence associations were forced not only to raise subscriptions across the board but also to introduce specialty differentials, in order to meet the threat of competitive entry by commercial insurers, and this exacerbated the cost increase for the high-risk specialties. Canadian specialists similarly experi enced a treble shock in the 1980s: an overall rate increase owing to rising claims costs was exacer bated by a move to specialty-specific rates and pre funding rather than pay-as-you-go financing, pre cipitated by the threat of competitive entry into the liability insurance market. This contrasts with the Swedish experience, where flat rating and partially pay-as-you-go financing have persisted because the PCI is operated by a monopoly insurer consor tium. As noted earlier, Swedish entry into the EC may disrupt this tranquil monopoly. Although switching to specialty rating-a rough proxy for claims experience-is temporarily disruptive, in the long run it is generally consistent with efficient internalization of costs to activities that generate high injury costs. However, this presumes that the Claims process is accurate or at least unbiased. If in practice the higherclaims rate forsurgical specialties reflects the fact that surgical errors are more obvi ous than medical errors, some inter-specialty cross subsidies may be justified.
Although the NHS indemnity may be viewed as a form of fault-based enterprise liability, efficiency gains are likely to be realized only as liability is transferred to self-governing trust hospitals and fundholding GP practices. Enterprise liability is intended to increase deterrence and reduce over head costs by placing liability on the single party that has the information and the authority necessary tomake decisions with respect to risk management.
Employer liability for workplace injuries fits this model, as do fully integrated HMOs that are exclu sive for providers and patients. If the NHS internal market is effective, the role of district health author ities is as purchasers on behalf of patients. Hospi tals and, in particular, the self-governing trust hos pitals, are intended to be autonomous entities that assume responsibility for the cost and quality of the services that they deliver. Thus placing liability on district health authorities is at odds with the separa tion of purchasers and providers, whereas transfer ring liability to self-governing hospitals and fundholding GP practices could realize efficiency gains. Similarly, proposals in the US to transfer liability from individual physicians and hospitals to health plans, would probably reduce deterrence and increase administrative cost if applied to tradi tional fee-for-service plans and loose networks HMOs (independent practice associations). Enter prise liability is likely to be efficient only for fully integrated health-care systems such as staff model HMOs, where the health plan has the information and authority to manage the delivery of care.
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
There is no simple solution to the problems of professional liability. The rationale for profession al liability arises from asymmetric information between patients and providers. But changing the liability rule transfers decision-making to courts and liability insurers which also lack good informa tion. Unpredictable and sometimes erroneous deci sion-making by these parties creates incentives for filing invalid claims, defensive medicine, and in vestments in litigation to influence the outcome.
The ideal reforms would improve the accuracy of the decision-making process, structure benefits ac cording to sound insurance principles, and impose sanctions for abuse of the system. This in turn should assure efficient deterrence and compensa tion.
My personal judgement is that an administrative fault-based system, with scheduled payments for 
